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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
jected all rigid determinants in this regard. The Court held that due process
does not require a corporation to be within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court if it has such contacts with the territorial forum that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend the traditional notions of fair play.
Foreign insurance corporations which depend on good will and volun-
tary solicitations of existing members for new business and which are not
represented by agents or brokers in the state are generally held not to be
doing business in a foreign state.8 Some courts in reaching the same result
consider the situs of the execution of the contract as controlling,9 and since,
in the absence of agents, the place of execution and performance is the
corporation's home state, the result reached is in accord with the majority
view. However, a distinction is recognized between doing business by a for-
eign corporation which would subject it to the jurisdiction of a foreign
court (not of its domicile), and doing business of the character that would
subject it to the power of the state to impose regulations on its activities.10
In this latter respect the courts have realized that the state has an interest
in the insurance of its citizens in order to protect them from loss,11 and that
in protecting that interest the state may impose regulations on the method
of sale and distribution of insurance contracts. 12
In the instant case, the Court does not decide that the corporation's
superficial contacts in a foreign state are sufficient to constitute doing busi-
ness in the sense that the corporation is subject to an in personam decree
of a court of the foreign jurisdiction. What has been done in the instant
case is to affirm the authority of the state, by a reasonable exercise of its
police powers, to regulate the sale of securities within its borders.18
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL LIBERTIES-SEGREGATION
ON GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL LEVEL
In accordance with State law,1 petitioner's application for admission
to the University of Texas Law School was rejected solely because he was
8. Sasnett v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 90 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1937); Shway-
der v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 255 Fed. 797 (D. Colo. 1918); Pembleton
v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 289 Ill. 99, 124 N.E. 355 (1919); Minnesota Coi-
mercial Men's Ass'n v, Benn, supra note 6.
9. Storey v. United Shoe Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. S.C. 1946); Allgeyer V.
Louisiana, supra note 5. But qf. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914).
10. Begole Aircraft Supplies, Inc. v. Pacific Airmotive Corp., 212 P.2d 860 (Colo.
1949).
11. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
12. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); Osborn v. Oslin, 310
U.S. 53 (1940).
13. 1all v. Geiger Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539(1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yard Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917)
(in which the "Blue Sky" laws of Ohio, South Dakota and Michigan were upheld); cf.
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1938); Home Insurance Co. of N.Y. v.
Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874); Paul v. State of Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
1. TEx. CONST. Art. VII, §§ 7, 14; TEX. STAT, REV. Civ. §§ 2643b, 2719, 2900,
(Stpp. 1949).
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a Negro. The State trial 'court continued his suit for mandanuis for six
months, by the expiration of which time a law school for Negroes was made
available, and then refused to grant reliei. On remand by the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals, the trial court found the new Negro law school substan-
tially equal to the established white law school. Four and a half years after
the original applipation, the United States Supreme Court, on certiorari to
the Texas Supreme Court, held, that the petitioner must be admitted to the
University of Texas Law School because of a lack of equality in the facilities
offered by the two schools. Sweatt v. Painter, 338 U.S. 865 (1950).
Opposed to the early belief that the Negro was an inferior subhuman
being, 2 the decision in the noted case was heralded as a victory and given
international publication.2 The universality of interest in the problem and
its existence is, however, overlooked by those who consider segregation to be
based on stupidity, intolerance and a desire to avoid competition on thc
part of the Southerner.4 In the United States it affects not only the Negro,
but also Indians,5 Mexicans, 6 and Asiatics7 Nor is it confined to the South,
but extends north and exists in every other area where, minorities are to
be found.
The law of Texas, O sixteen other Southern states,' 0 and the Distri6t of
Columbia" provide for separation of the races in school. Such enactments
for the segregation of races have been held valid and not to violate provisions
of the Constitution of the United States when substantially equal privileges
were furnished the separated groups within the state,' 2 by the state,'8 and at
2. See Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (U.S. 1856) passim,.
3. Heman Sweatt's Victory, Life, October 16, 1950, p. 64.
4. See Ross, Book Review, 4 Mmi L.Q. 409 (1950).
5. See Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 Pac. 926 (1924); Aminons
v. School Dist., 7 R.I. 596 (1863).
6. See Westminster School v. Mendez, 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), af 'd,
161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
7. See Gung Lum v. Rice, 275. U.S. 78 (1927).
8. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949); 4 MtAMI L.Q. 102
(1949).
9. See note 1, supra.
10. ALA. CoNsT. Art. XIV, § 256, ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 93 (1940); ARK. DIG. STAT.§ 11535(c) (1937); DEL. CONST. Art. X, § 2; DEL. Rpv. CODE § 2631 (1935); FLA.
CONST. Art. XII, § 12; FLA. STAT. § 228.09 (1949); GA. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 1; GA.
CODE ANN. § 937 (Supp. 1947); Ky. CONST. § 187; KY. REv. STA'r. ANN. § 158.020(1943); LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 1; MD. ArNw. CODE GE,. L ws Art. 77, § 192 (1939);
Miss. CONST. Art. VIII, § 207, Miss. CODE ANN. § 6276 (1942); Mo. CONST. Art. XI,
§ 3, Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10349 (1943); N.C. CONsT. Art. IX, . 2; N.C. GN. STA'T.
ANN, § 115-2 (1943); OA. CONsr. ART. I, § 5; OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 455 as amended
Laws 1949, Art. 20, § 9; S.C. CoNs'r. Art. X1, § 7; S.C. CODE ANN. § 5377 (1942);
Trc.N,. Cor s. Art. XI, § 12; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2377 (Villiams 1934); VA. CONsr.
Art. IX. § 140; VA. CODE ANN. § 680 (1942); V. VA. CoNsT. Art, XII, § 8; V. V.k.
CODE ANN. § 1775 (1949).
11. 18 STAT, part 2, § 306, as amended; D.C. CODE § 31-1112 (1940).
12. State of Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (rejecting
State's offer to pay tuition at Negro law school in adjoining state).
13. Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., supra note 5 (the statc ;us uot excused from.
providing educational facilities for Indian childrea by virtuc of the fact that within thc
same school district the federal government maintained an Indian school).
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the same time as they were made available to students of other races.14 This
"separate but equal" rule, asserted in school segregation cases, was adopted
from Pessy v. Ferguson," in which it was held that a statute requiring public
carriers to separate their passengers according to a racial classification did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution so long
as equal facilities were available to each race. In determining the equality
of school facilities, consideration has been given to size and value of the
school building and property, location of school and transportation, expen-
diture per pupil, length of term, number and qualifications of teachers,
courses of study available, and opportunities for extra-curricular activities.' 6
Recently, in a white graduate school to which a Negro had been admitted
on a segrated basis, the Court found a lack of equality of treatment because
of restrictions which interfered with discussion and exchange of views with
other students. 17 Equality has thus become a fulcrum by which the courts
have progressively forced several states'8 to abandon their segregation policy
in the graduate and professional school level.
Refusing to consider over-ruling the validity of segregation statutes, the
Court's decision in the noted case turned on consideration of the equality
of ficilities. The Texas State University for Negroes with its five professors;
student body of 23; library of 1.6,500 volumes; practice court; and legal aid
society; was found to be not substantially equal to the white University of
Texas Law School with its faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time
professors, some of whom enjoy national recognition as authorities in their
field; 850 students; 65,000 volume library; law review; moot court facilities;
and scholarship funds. Attention was not only given to the new school's
physical plant, library, faculty, and curriculum, but also to two other attri-
butes, which no new school can possibly have: distinguished alumni and
rich tradition. Thus, the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson,
first used to sustain the constitutionality of seperation of the races, was em-
ployed by the Court to avoid segregation.
By whittling down the Plessy v. Ferguson rule to a point where no new
graduate school can be considered equal to a long established graduate
school (because of a lack of prestige and alumni in the former), the court
saves the graduate school from the interference of the intolerant individual
who must now practice his prejudices unaided by the coercive power of the
law. 10 In theory, it is difficult to distinguish graduate and professional
schools from the lower level schools. But, in practice, it is obvious that
fewer persons are affected on the graduate level and therefore harmony is
14. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. See Note, 103 A.L.R. 713 (1936).
17. MeLaurin v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 70 (1950) (Negro pursuing studies leading
to Doctorate in Education, assigned to classroom seat in row reserved for colored, special
table in library and in cafeteria, thus restricting ready intercourse with other students).
18. Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, West Virginia and Oklahoma.
19. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
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more readily attained. The solution of the problem in the lower schools
is and should be left to time20 and legislative action. 21
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - NOTICE BY
PUBLICATION IN SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS
OF STATUTORY COMMON TRUST FUND
Trustee of common trust fund filed a petition for judicial settlement
of accounts as prescribed in a statute authorizing the establishment of the
common trust fund.1 When the first investment in the fund was made,
the trustee notified each beneficiary by mail. The notice given in this
petition was by publication as set out in the statute.2 The beneficiaries so
served were not all within the jurisdiction of the court. Held, that under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the statutory notice does not afford due pro-
cess of law to those beneficiaries whose place of residence is known, but
is sufficient to those beneficiaries whose whereabouts could not reasonably
be ascertained. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 70 Sup. Ct.
652 (1950).
In the determination of what constitutes due process of law with re-
spect to adequacy of notice under the Fourteenth Amendment, a distinction
is usually drawn between actions in rem and in personam.3 A proceeding
in personam is against the person based on jurisdiction of the person,4 while
a proceeding in rem, against property, involves jurisdiction over the res to
be adjudicated by the court.5 Actions in personarn are further distinguished
from those in rem since, in the latter, a valid judgment is obtained without
personal service of process, while personal service is a condition precedent
to a valid judgment in personam. 6 Proceedings quasi in rem, against a
person in respect to property within the jurisdiction,7 include those actions
to adjudicate interests of persons designated and constructively served as
unknown.8
The adequacy of service by publication depends on whether it is reason-
ably calculated, under the circumstances, to give the necessary parties an
actual knowledge of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. The
20. See 2 BEVERInCE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL, 21 (1919) (these "distinctions and
Prejudices exist to be subdued only by the grave.").
21. See Cart v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
1. N.Y. BANKINc LAw § 100-c.
2. N.Y. BANuqNc LAw § 100-c (12).
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. McCormick v. Blaine, ,245 Ill. 461, 178 N.E. 195 (1931).
5. See Beck v. Otero Irr. Dist., (D. Colo.). 50 F.2d 951, 953 (1931).
6. White v. Glover, 138 App. Div. 797, 123 N.Y. Supp. 482 (1st Dep't 1910).
7. Hill v. Henry, 66 N.J. Eq. 150, 57 Atl. 554 (1904); Gassert v. Strong, 38 Mont.
18, 98 Pac. 497 (1908).
8. 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1522 (5th ed. 1925).
9. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
